Finish Ukraine’s ‘bridge’ to NATO membership

Defense officials, diplomats, researchers and reporters are all talking about Ukraine’s “bridge to NATO membership” – something Kyiv was promised in 2008. With Ukraine mutilated by Vladimir Putin’s invasion forces, that promise and that bridge seem broken. However, where there’s a will, there’s a way to bring Ukraine into the NATO alliance – the only source of security in Europe.

Tomorrow. First things first: As I’ve argued since 2022, NATO’s objective should be to help Ukrainians secure what they define as victory. In other words, the Ukrainian people shouldn’t be forced into signing a peace deal they oppose.

The good news in this regard is that all 32 members of the alliance declared during NATO’s Washington Summit in July that they “will never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea” and that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.”

Toward that end, the alliance has stood up the NATO-Ukraine Council(NUC), which gives Kyiv a seat at the NATO table, ensures joint consultations, and enhances decision-making and coordination. The alliance has established a Security Assistance and Training Command to “coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine” and thus cement the work of the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contract Group – an ad hoc coalition of 50 nations that have sent economic and military aid to Ukraine since 2022. Finally, the alliance has encouraged its members to hammer out bilateral security agreements with Ukraine.

Taken together, these initiatives “constitute a bridge to Ukraine’s membership in NATO,” as NATO’s political leaders explained at the close of the July summit.

Each of these efforts is important in carrying Ukraine beyond the hell of today to a brighter tomorrow. The NUC, for instance, formalizes and institutionalizes Ukraine’s interaction with NATO. According to NATO’s military headquarters, the 700-strong assistance-and-training command utilizes NATO structures to put delivery of military aid to Ukraine “on a firmer footing” and to “provide more predictability” to Kyiv. And the bilateral security arrangements serve as the supporting pillars for that bridge to NATO membership.

More than a dozen NATO members have forged such agreements. Britain promises “security assistance and military equipment across the land, air, sea, space and cyber domains.” Poland vows to continue “equipping and training Ukraine’s security and defense forces” and “to maintain its leading role in ensuring efficient supply of armaments and equipment to Ukraine” via the air-road-railway logistics hub in Rzeszów (80% of Ukraine-bound military aid travels through Poland). Germany pledges “air defense, artillery, armored vehicles … ammunition” and “cooperation in the field of intelligence.” France is delivering “sustained security assistance (and) modern military equipment across all domains.” Italy is providing “air defense, artillery, long-range firepower, armored vehicles, demining, reconnaissance means, unmanned systems, engineer means, information technologies, electronic warfare, air force and maritime capabilities.”

Under the U.S.-Ukraine security agreement, the United States pledges “support … in developing a modern NATO-interoperable force,” “a credible defense and deterrence capability,” “combined military maneuvers and exercises,” “defense industrial cooperation,” “joint planning to confront threats,” “cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure,” “procurement of squadrons of modern fighter aircraft,” coastal defense systems, unmanned watercraft, surface vessels, and air-defense systems. The 10-year agreement, signed in June, pointedly declares, “Ukraine’s future is in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

Importantly, this agreement doesn’t commit U.S. troops to fight Putin’s mercenaries and soldiers in the mud of eastern Ukraine. In fact, it does the opposite: The better equipped, better trained and better prepared the Ukrainians are, the more successful they will be on the battlefield, the more secure NATO’s easternmost members will be, and the less likely it will be that U.S. troops will have to engage Putin’s army directly. That underscores how arming Ukraine is in the national interest.

These bilateral agreements are crucial because, even when the fighting stops, postwar Ukraine – whether it’s a NATO member or still in NATO’s waiting room – will need help deterring and defending against the enduring threat posed by a revisionist-imperialist Russia. This thick thatch of bilateral security partnerships bolsters Ukraine’s defense capabilities in the near term, while pulling Ukraine closer to the goal of NATO membership over the long term.

Yesterday. “Long” is the operative word. As noted earlier, NATO promised membership to Ukraine in April of 2008. Recognizing that NATO is the only guarantor of security in Europe, President George W. Bush led a bloc within NATO pushing to bring Ukraine (and Georgia) into the alliance. France and Germany opposed that effort. And since NATO operates by consensus, Ukraine and Georgia were left on the outside looking in – with a dangled promise of NATO membership but no pathway or bridge to that goal.

Some view that decision as a bullet dodged for NATO. But it was actually an opportunity missed – and a green light for Putin, who proceeded to lop off part of Georgia in late 2008 and part of Ukraine in early 2014, before trying to finish the job in 2022.

There’s growing momentum within the alliance to correct the mistake of 2008, as NATO members finally recognize that what the North Atlantic Treaty calls the “stability and … security of the North Atlantic area” is threatened by instability and insecurity in Ukraine. NATO won’t be secure if Ukraine is left unsecured. The best way to ensure Ukraine’s security is NATO membership.

Of course, bringing a country at war into the alliance is not an option. But Ukraine won’t be at war forever.

There are signals from both Kyiv and Moscow that they are willing to meet at the negotiating table. Ukraine’s foreign minister visited Beijing in July to discuss with Russia’s chief ally the prospects for peace talks. Putin leaked word that he would accept a ceasefire recognizing the current frontlines as the new borderlines. With 83,000 casualties this year alone, an estimated 550,000 total casualties, thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, planes, helicopters and ships destroyed, and almost a million of his subjects having fled the country since 2022, Putin may grasp that his planned three-day blitzkrieg to capture Kyiv – now in its 31st month – will never succeed.

While Russia has been in a position to dictate terms for the past year, the fortunes of war appear to be shifting back in Ukraine’s favor: Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks are torching Russia’s combat-critical infrastructure. Ongoing strikes with precision rocket systems are targeting Russian military assets in occupied Crimea – the center of gravity for Putin’s army. FPV drone assaults are taking a heavy toll of on Russia’s frontline positions. And Ukraine’s surprising ground assaults into Russia proper have yielded land and leverage Kyiv can use in any peace talks.

In short, with Ukraine tearing through Russian troops, territory and tanks, Kyiv may find itself in the position to dictate terms. 

What seems most likely is that Moscow and Kyiv will stagger to some sort of compromise representing less than what Russia wants (the subjugation of all of Ukraine) and less than what Ukraine wants (the liberation of all of Ukraine). This would be less than ideal: We must guard against exposing ourselves to the backend consequences of appeasing aggression, and, again, victory must be defined by Ukraine. But wherever the Russia-Ukraine border is ultimately drawn, history reminds us that neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security to allies and partners in the crosshairs – and that the free world can make an imperfect peace sustainable.

Consider post-World War II Germany. After an initial period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was reinvented, renamed, rearmed and invited into the NATO alliance as a full member in 1955 – all despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin, despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border, despite profound disagreements between the superpowers. In fact, the United States didn’t formally recognize the post-World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany and across Europe until 1975 – 30 years after the war’s end – and the people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for the reunification of East and West Germany. Those hopes weren’t realized until 1990.

Consider post-World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands, known in Japan as the Northern Territories. Despite this territorial disagreement, the United States entered into a security treaty with Japan in 1951 and a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Finally, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements, despite the absence of a peace treaty, despite – or perhaps because of – the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the United States provided security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people and government of South Korea, to this day, look forward to the full unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Each of these security solutions reminds us that where there’s a will to do difficult things, there’s a way to do them.

NATO membership is the way to secure Ukraine and enhance the security of every NATO member. “There is an antidote to chaos,” President Reagan observed after the free world won Cold War I. “Its name is NATO … We must extend NATO protections and the NATO framework to those who desire to be part of our alliance. Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.”

When the guns fall silent, NATO must summon the will to finish this bridge-building project and bring Ukraine into the alliance.