The free world must be prepared when China acts on its vow to annex the island democracy.
Xi Jinping wants to bring Taiwan under Chinese control. He’s orchestrating massive military exercises around Taiwan to underscore his seriousness. And he’s set a deadline for his armed forces to be ready to take Taiwan: 2027. To prevent Xi’s plans from coming to fruition and to preserve Taiwan’s independence, the free world must demonstrate the will and capability to sustain the island democracy.
Aggressor Xi’s words and actions are unmistakable.
He has declared that democratic Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. “We make no promise to abandon the use of force,” he warns. “Complete reunification of the motherland … will definitely be fulfilled.”
Xi’s words are deeply problematic. Taiwan has never been ruled by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), so “reunification” is inaccurate. He is misusing the word in an effort to legitimize plans to take over Taiwan and delegitimize Taiwan’s sovereignty. Only 2.4% of Taiwan’s population identifies as “Chinese.” And while Xi considers Taiwan the PRC’s 34th province, a scant 1.1% of Taiwanese support unification.
As to Xi’s actions: PRC wargames conducted last May blocked the northwest, southwest, southeast and east approaches to Taiwan. Beijing’s Joint Sword exercise in October, which enfolded 153 warplanes and dozens of warships, simulated a blockade. In December, the PRC deployed 90 warships around Taiwan. On a single day last November, the PRC surged 152 vessels into the waters around Taiwan, in what U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. Samuel Paparo ominously called “the largest rehearsal we've seen.”
What Xi is rehearsing is a military-backed annexation of Taiwan. He could attempt it in one of four ways:
· Xi could launch a full-scale invasion, which would likely entail airborne and seaborne landings, crippling cyberattacks and targeted missile strikes to seize the island by brute force.
· Xi could order a boa-constrictor blockade of Taiwan to choke the island into capitulation.
· Instead of attacking Taiwan’s main island, which sits about 100 miles away from the PRC, Xi could order his army to take one or more of Taiwan’s smaller islands – some are just three to six miles off the PRC coast – to test the international community.
· Xi could conduct a hybrid-war operation. Call it the Crimea Model, after Putin’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which used troops scrubbed of insignia to seize key facilities in Crimea. In a similar way, Xi could use commercial aircraft and commercial cargo ships from the PRC to cloak a clandestine invasion force.
Whatever method he chooses one thing is obvious: Xi is “preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait,” as the Pentagon concludes. If such a conflict comes, it won’t be a fair fight. According to a Pentagon report, PRC assets based in the Taiwan Strait area include 420,000 troops, 750 fighter jets, 300 bombers and 158 warships (including three amphibious assault ships and 50 landing ships). In addition, the PRC has more than 1,600 missiles opposite Taiwan.
Taiwan, by comparison, has 89,000 troops total, 300 fighter jets total, 123 warships total.
Target Taiwan is working to correct that deterrence gap.
However, even with recent increases, Taiwan will invest only 2.5% of GDP in defense this year. Compare that to other nations in the crosshairs: Israel spends more than 5% of GDP on defense. Poland will invest 5% of GDP in defense this year. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all spend more than 3% of GDP on defense. Finland’s defense budget has jumped 82.5% since 2021. Japan will double defense spending by 2027.
Investing in deterrence is costly. But there’s something far more costly than deterring war: waging war. Just consider Ukraine, which is diverting a quarter of its GDP to defense and has lost 43,000 soldiers killed in action, tens of thousands of civilians and thousands of square-miles of territory.
President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan recently noted, “I deeply admire former President Ronald Reagan’s approach of peace through strength … I will enhance reform of and bolster national defense, demonstrating to the world the Taiwanese people’s determination to defend our homeland.”
Lai’s words set the right tone, but Taiwan needs to invest more in its military to deter Beijing.
Toward that end, Taiwan let it be known in November that it had received an undisclosed number of ATACMS missile systems from the United States, bringing PRC coastal staging areas within range, as well as shorter-range HIMARS rocket artillery systems. Taipei in December received 38 M1A2 Abrams tanks and expects delivery of 66 F-16V fighters in the near future. In addition, Taipei is reportedly pushing for mothballed U.S. warships, F-35 fighter-bombers and additional Patriot air-defense systems.
President-elect Donald Trump is confident Xi will not attack Taiwan “while I'm president,” but he’s urged Taipei to make huge increases in defense spending, calling on Taiwan to spend 10% of GDP on defense.
How much is spent may not be as important as how and where Taiwan’s defense dollars are spent. What’s been termed “a porcupine defense” – one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it – would focus on antiship missiles, “smart” mines capable of remote activation/deactivation, inexpensive UCAVs and drones capable of swarm attacks, shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles, VSTOL fighter-bombers capable of operating without runways, nondigital communications operable despite cyberattacks, and a citizenry trained and equipped for small-unit operations.
These are the kinds of countermeasures that have bled Putin’s army. Indeed, Xi must be made to understand that attempting in Taiwan what Putin has done in Ukraine will lead not to victory parades and an ascendant legacy, but to his troops in body bags, his military hardware in flames and his international standing in tatters.
If Xi’s wargames are any indication, it doesn’t appear that – as of yet – Taiwan has done enough to convince him that the costs of attacking would far outweigh the benefits.
Defender That’s where the United States and a handful of allies come into the equation. As Taiwan builds up its deterrent capabilities, the free world must send Beijing the sort of signals and provide Taipei the sort of support that will give Xi pause.
A threshold question must be addressed: Why does Taiwan matter to the United States?
First, a PRC attack on Taiwan would directly affect three of America’s top-10 trading partners, disrupt one-third of global shipping and put at risk more than half of the world’s semiconductor production.
Second, a PRC-controlled Taiwan would give Beijing the ability to dominate the South China Sea and East China Sea, vastly enhance its ability to project naval power, and enable Beijing to hold sway over sea lanes vital to the U.S. and international trade.
Third, a PRC takeover of Taiwan would give Xi reason to believe he can move against other targets. In addition to Taiwan, Beijing has territorial disputes with more than a dozen nations, including U.S. treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. If America failed to come to Taiwan’s defense, those allies would doubt America’s security commitment, and Beijing would exploit those doubts to great effect.
All of that explains U.S. actions and signals in recent months.
On multiple occasions, President Joe Biden said the United States would defend Taiwan if attacked.
Paparo revealed plans in mid-2024 to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape” if the PRC were to lunge at Taiwan. The plan calls for “using a number of classified capabilities, so that I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.” Paparo emphasized that the plan and the capabilities needed to execute it are “real” and “deliverable.”
The United States has deployed A-10s in the Philippines, based B-52s and Marines in Australia, refurbished bases on Tinian, Wake Island and Peleliu, and even dispatched military trainers to Taiwan.
Japan and the United States are developing joint operational plans to deploy rapid-response units armed with surface-to-surface and anti-air missile systems on Japan’s southwestern-most islands. The proof of concept is already in the field: The past 17 months have seen U.S. Army units on Palau test land-based missiles against seagoing targets, deployment to the Philippines of Army units capable of launching Tomahawks, and the Marine Corps stand up rapid-deployment units equipped with Tomahawks.
In addition, Japan vows to “closely cooperate” with the Pentagon in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Japanese defense officials have declared, “The peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan.” And Tokyo has emphasized, “We have to protect Taiwan as a democratic country.”
Likewise, Australian defense officials say it would be “inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the U.S.” in defending Taiwan.
Several allies have sent warships through the Taiwan Strait to defend freedom of the seas, including Britain, Japan, France, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Turkey and Australia.
Parallel The White House warnings, the missile deployments, the disclosure of “hellscape,” the Taiwan Strait transits – all of these aim at deterring a PRC invasion. But how would the free world respond to a blockade?
A blockade of Taiwan would create a humanitarian disaster. Taiwan imports 1.4 million metric tons of wheat and 4.5 million metric tons of corn annually, and it holds only two months of reserve supply of these essential grains, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Taiwan imports 97.7% of its energy supply.
To put Xi on notice that a blockade would fail, the United States and its allies should not only begin planning for escort operations, but should rehearse such operations, delineate corridors to key seaports on Taiwan, and define why sealift operations would be permitted and justified under international law.
The justification would be the PRC’s own actions around the island. Because it would ensure delivery of food, energy and other vital goods, the mission of this sealift taskforce would be wholly humanitarian. Indeed, for allies and partners concerned about the need for some sort of blessing under international law, Articles 11, 14, 51, 52 and 55 of the UN Charter would check that box.
The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which enfolds a number of taskforces providing security to shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf, could serve as the operational model for such an effort. As with CMF, a coalition of willing partners could pool their resources – naval, air, intelligence – to ensure the Indo-Pacific remains open to the free flow of commerce and Taiwan remains free to determine its own destiny. In other words, the sealift task force would simply maintain the status quo.
The Berlin Airlift, which sustained and rescued West Berlin from another communist behemoth in 1948-1949, could serve as the historical model. As with the Berlin Airlift, the military vessels involved would be there not to threaten or attack, but to ensure delivery of life-sustaining goods and products. And as with the Berlin Airlift, the escorts could be withdrawn once Xi withdrew his threat.
Perhaps the Taiwan Sealift would rally the free world and strike a blow for freedom in these early chapters of Cold War II, just as Operation Vittles did in the early chapters of Cold War I.
Arming Taiwan with sufficient capability to deter Beijing won’t be easy. Deploying assets to prevent an attack on Taiwan won’t be easy. Demonstrating the capacity to break a blockade of Taiwan won’t be easy. But all of this is preferable to trying to claw back a conquered Taiwan, watching Taiwan suffer and starve, or letting Xi absorb a free people.
- Landing Zone